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We nd that the United States in the 1950s and 1960s was characterized by strong
\catch-up growth" in the south with capital owing from rich northern states to poorer
southern states|consistent with the predictions of the simple neoclassical model. After
the 1970s, \catch-up growth" is mainly over in the United States and capital is owing
to productive (rich) states. For Europe, we nd that capital has been owing from the
richer countries to the poorer countries since the 1970s with no signs yet of the \catch-up"
phase having run its course, except for the country of Ireland.
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Standard neoclassical models predict that capital will move from regions where the marginal
product of capital is relatively low to regions where it is relatively high. Within a fully
integrated capital market with no \frictions," this implies that the capital stock will be
highest in regions with the highest level of productivity. As shown by Blomstrom, Lipsey,
and Zejan (1996) and Clark and Feenstra (2003), in a world of completely mobile capital
the amount of physical capital installed in a country relative to the world average is fully
explained by the relative level of total factor productivity. In reality, the marginal product
of capital may deviate from the return obtained by owners of capital, such as stock holders
or direct owners, for numerous reasons. Risk-adjusted returns to investment may not be as
high as suggested by simple neoclassical models for countries with low capital-labor ratios.
Kraay and Ventura (2000) argue that low productivity countries' implied risk premiums on
investment are quite high. Countries with low capital may also receive less foreign investment
due to their low level of total factor productivity. Recent research show a positive relation
between capital ows and various proxies for productivity, such as good institutions (Alfaro,
Kalemli-Ozcan, Volosovych, 2007), low cost of physical capital (Hsieh and Klenow, 2007;
Caselli and Feyrer, 2007), and low risk of default (Gertler and Rogo, 1990; Reinhart and
Rogo, 2004). As a result capital might ow \uphill" from poor to rich countries rather than
the opposite direction predicted by standard models. This observation is originally made
by Lucas (1990) and recently discussed by Prasad et al. (2007) in the context of the 1990s
globalization period. In a closely related paper, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) show that
capital, on net, tend go to low growth, rather than to the predicted high growth countries. The
pervasiveness of deviations of country-level data from the predictions of simple neoclassical
models is such that one may question if such models are of any relevance in explaining capital
ows. The disconnect between the models and the empirical evidence becomes more pressing
in light of the recent global imbalances in capital ows|the answer to the question, \Where
does capital ow?" is becoming of rst-order policy importance.
In the United States and the EU, where capital markets are supposed to be fully in-
tegrated, laws and institutions are intended to secure the free ow of capital. Two of the
co-authors of the present paper have studied the patterns of capital ows between U.S. states
in Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, Srensen, and Yosha (2007) and between regions within the EU-
countries in Ekinci, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Srensen (2007). These studies show that capital
ows between regions within countries such as the United States and Germany are consistent
with the predictions of neoclassical models while those between European countries are not.
An important question is then why capital is not owing as freely between EU countries as
1between regions and whether this appears to be a permanent pattern or whether EU countries
are becoming more like U.S. states.
We compare and contrast capital ows between U.S. states with capital ows between
EU countries. Specically we ask: are EU countries becoming more like U.S. states? When
did this process start? Does it appear to be an accelerating process? Does it include all
EU countries or certain subsets? We take a recent historical perspective and compare the
integration of U.S. capital markets since 1950 with that of EU countries since 1970. Our main
goal is to highlight trends in nancial integration and the direction of capital ows rather
than systematically explore why integration may be imperfect.
In Europe, as well as in the United States, the northern countries and regions had high
output and income levels early in the 20th century in comparison with their southern coun-
terparts. In a setting of integrated markets capital should ow from capital abundant regions
in the north to labor abundant regions in the south, but for various reasons this did not hap-
pen. In Europe, capital ows between countries were severely curtailed after the outbreak of
World War I. Following a slow recovery in the 1920s capital ows were cut o by the great
depression and World War II, and markets were only slowly opened in the post-War period
culminating with the Maastricht Treaty allowing for free movements of capital between EU
countries. In the United States, no formal barriers to capital ows existed but for various
reasons capital did not ow south in the early part of the century. Caselli and Coleman (2001)
argue that this was an equilibrium outcome where low schooling combined with an agrarian
economy that gave scant reward to education kept many states in U.S. South at a level of
low average productivity. In their model North and South are equally ecient at producing
non-farm goods. However, atmospheric and soil conditions give the South a comparative ad-
vantage in farming. The two regions freely trade in the two goods, and all factors (other than
land) freely move across regional borders. This leads to an optimum allocation of resources
in which the production of farm goods is concentrated in the South. Per capita income in
the South is then lower because the labor input for farm goods is mostly low-skilled workers.
As the economy grows, these mechanisms push increasing fractions of successive cohorts of
southern workers out of lower-wage farming and into higher-wage manufacturing, while at
the same time increasing relative wages for those southern workers remaining in farming.
Both these features of the structural transformation therefore lead to regional convergence
in average labor incomes. We do not attempt to add to this discussion but document the
patterns of capital ows that followed the removal of barriers whatever these were.
We nd that the United States in the 1950s and 1960s was characterized by strong \catch-
up growth" in the south|consistent with the predictions of the simple neoclassical model.
2Income and output levels were converging to those of the north and capital was owing from
rich northern states to poorer southern states. However, we nd no pattern of capital owing
to relatively poor states after the 1970s|if anything, capital ows to productive (rich) states
within the United States. Our interpretation is that the \catch-up" phase is over in the
United States and capital now ows to states that are hit by positive productivity shocks.
In this situation, where \catch-up growth" is over, a state that has experienced a positive
productivity shock will tend to be a high output state and, as a result, capital tend to ow to
these high output states. For Europe, we nd that capital has been owing from the richer
countries to the poorer countries since the 1970s, consistent with \catch-up growth," with no
signs yet of this \catch-up" phase having run its course, except for the country of Ireland,
which appears to be an outlier.
Our results can help understand the process of integration in Europe. \Catch-up growth"
in the United States roughly was over 20 years after World War II, while it appears that
the process is going to take a while longer for Europe. There can be many reasons why
this process has not yet come to an end, ranging from government policy, regulations, and
institutions broadly dened. We illustrate briey that the level of nancial integration is
higher in countries with better institutions, measured as either an index of entry costs or an
index of investor protection.
2 Comparing U.S. States to EU countries
2.1 The model
Our model ignores adjustment costs and business cycle patterns and is intended to charac-
terize the \medium run." Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the capital stock and
its marginal product (MPK) when output is determined by a Cobb-Douglas function and
highlights how this relationship depends on the level of productivity within a small open
economy framework. Let K be the country's capital stock and A be its productivity level.
The MPK schedule shows how marginal product varies as the capital stock increases. For a
given labor force, L, productivity, A, and depreciation (), an increase in the capital stock,
K, reduces its marginal product due to the law of diminishing returns.1 Under the small
economy assumption the world interest rate is constant (assumed to be 0.06). The domestic
capital stock is determined by the equation MPK = R. In Figure 1, the level of the capital
stock is K1 for the least productive of the two regions illustrated. Holding labor constant,
the equilibrium level of the capital stock is higher in a country with higher productivity,
1Note that the return to capital, , is assumed to be 0.33.
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such as the second country in Figure 1 with capital stock K2. The equilibrium capital stock
K2 corresponds to the MPK schedule given by the dashed line where productivity is higher
(assumed to be 1.5 times higher than the productivity level corresponding to the solid MPK
line; i.e., A2 = 1:5A1).
Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, Sorensen, Yosha (2007) show within a regression framework that
capital in the United States tends to ow to fast growing states which also on average are
high output states. They assume that each region's output is determined by a Cobb-Douglas
production function where the level of \productivity" diers across regions and subject to
occasional shocks that last for a number of years. Such shocks can be purely technological
but can also be regulatory shocks or relative price shocks. For example, the return to capital
in regions that specialize in oil-extraction is a function of the world oil price.
Under the assumption that capital adjusts to the equilibrium level within one period (a
\period" corresponds to, say, a decade in the data) following productivity shocks, this model
predicts a positive relationship between capital ows and output growth. The mechanism is
simply that productivity shocks leads to a higher growth and to a higher return to capital
as shown in Figure 1. Capital ows in, until the equilibrium is reached where returns are
equalized in all regions. Thus, we dene integrated capital markets to include the condition
that the returns to capital is equated.
We will call capital markets to be \fully integrated" under the further condition that the
4ownership of capital is fully diversied. The model sketched in Figure 1 is deterministic, but
we consider that an expository simplication of a model with uncertainty but no signicant
risk premia because of perfect diversication of capital ownership. Under this assumption, an
increase in productivity in a region leads to an increase in output|Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) or its regional counterpart|but is associated with a lower increase in income of the
region|Gross National Income (GNI). Why? Simply because the increase in productivity
leads to a higher return to capital installed in the country and this capital is mainly owned
by residents of other regions (assuming that each region is small compared to the total area
under consideration).2
For countries, this prediction automatically translates into a positive relation between
the current account (with sign reversed) and growth. For U.S. states, we have approximate
current accounts for 1953 and 1957 from Romans (1965), who painstakingly constructed
estimates of saving and investment by state, but not for other years. However, past current
account decits will be reected in current factor income payments (interest, dividends, and
prots) and an outow of factor income will lower income relative to output. Hence, we use
the ratio of output to income as our proxy for past capital inows. The output/income ratio
will be larger than one for debtor states which have been recipients of capital (we re-scale
it to be unity on average for each state) and smaller than one for creditor states who are
receiving net capital income. Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, Sorensen, Yosha (2007) show the ratio
of output to income for a region can be expected to increase by about 1/3 times the level of
relative output growth in the previous period.3
A simple consequence of the above is that if all states start out at about the same level
of output then the states that are subject to relatively large increases in productivity will
become states that will be debtors and at the same time will have a relatively high level of
output. In other words, we expect states and countries|if the phase of \catch-up growth"
has come to an end|with relatively high output to be debtors.4 In this article, we graphically
verify the predictions that capital ows to high growth states or countries and we examine if
U.S. states and European countries, respectively, appear to be past the \catch-up phase."
2This assumption holds to a rst degree approximation for U.S. states compared to the total United States
and for EU countries compared to the total EU.
3If the EU belonged to a fully integrated world market the ratio of output to income might increase by
about a third times output growth but because we only want to examine the degree of integration among EU
countries, we focus on relative output growth.
4Note that Kraay and Ventura (2000) develop a model where investment risk is high and not diversied.
An implication of their model is that the current account response to a productivity shock should be equal
to the savings generated by the shock multiplied by country's share of foreign assets in its savings portfolio.
This implies that positive productivity shocks lead to decits in debtor countries and surpluses in creditor
countries.
52.2 Results: U.S States
As in Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, Sorensen, and Yosha (2007), we use data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). All nominal variables are converted into 2000 prices using the
consumer price index. State-level GDP, denoted gross state product (GSP), is published by
the BEA as part of the U.S. state-level national accounts. GSP is derived as the sum of value
added originating in all industries in the state, thus, it is exactly the state-level equivalent of
GDP. GSP numbers are based on income generated in establishments and the main sources
are industrial censuses such as the census of manufactures. GSP is available for the years
1977{2000. Previously published, but no longer updated by the BEA, GSP is available since
1963, but that data is not fully compatible with the data post 1977. Our main measure for
income is state-level personal income (SPI), which is available from the BEA. SPI is based
mainly on surveys of individual income.
The output/income ratio is our measure of the relative magnitude of net inter-state capital
income ows to a state. If such ows are zero, the ratio is unity; if they are negative, the ratio
exceeds unity; and if they are positive, the ratio is less than unity. The variables SPI and
GSP contain aggregate (U.S.-wide) components. These aggregate eects are not of interest







SPIt = i SPIit; GSPt = i GSPit :
The ratio Output=Incomeit captures state i's output/income ratio in year t relative to the ag-
gregate output/income ratio of the U.S. states.
The main reason for this methodology is the unavailability of the state level \current
accounts." In Table 1, we display the 1953 and 1957 \current accounts" by state from
Romans (1965). More precisely, we display saving minus investment for these years. Those
numbers clearly show that saving minus investment was very large and negative for southern
states as well as for oil states. It is clear that during this period capital was owing from the
north and west to oil-rich states such as Texas and Louisiana, as well as to states in the old
south, such as Mississippi and Alabama, which were in the process of catching up. The states
with large negative values of saving minus investment in the 1950s tend to be the states with
high output/income ratios in the 1980s and 1990s.
We examine directly if the output/income ratio captures past \current accounts" by re-
gressing the output/income ratio averaged over 1963{70 on the average of \current accounts"
6normalized by population for the years 1953 and 1957 (averaging may reduce measurement
error). The results of this regression are displayed in the rst column of Table 2 (see also
Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, Sorensen, and Yosha 2007). We nd a highly signicant value of
the coecient to the past \current account" with an R2 of 0.51. Clearly, there is a strong
relationship between the output/income ratio and the \current account" ten years earlier.
In columns 2{4, we display the results for similar regressions for the decades of the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s. We observe a decline in explanatory power as we consider more recent
decades but the \current account" from the mid 1950s is still a signicant determinant of the
output/income ratio in the 1990s with an R2 of 0.19.
Next we look at the predictions of the model. Figures 2{5 display the relation between the
current account or output/income ratio in the late 20th century and previous period output
and growth for the United States. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, throughout the sample
period there is a positive relationship between capital ows and output growth, exactly as
predicted by the model.5 This shows that nancial markets are well integrated within the
United States.
Figure 4 demonstrates that in the early part of the century there is a negative relation
between capital ows and income levels, whereas, as shown in Figure 5, in the latter part
of the century this relationship turns to positive. Hence, there is evidence of \catch-up
growth" by southern states in the early part of the century, with the \catch-up" phase being
over in the latter part of the sample when capital starts owing to high output states. The
oil-states, Alaska (AK), Wyoming (WY), and Louisiana (LA) are clear outliers but even
without them the pattern is visible. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) documented that
regional output levels (approximated by income levels) were converging in the early part of
1900s. They interpret convergence in the context of a one-sector model with frictions to
the movement of (physical or human) capital; when these frictions are removed convergence
follows. The results in Figure 4 are consistent with convergence and further document that
ows of capital to the poorer southern regions were reinforcing productivity growth in the
south. However, we also consider our results consistent with the alternative view of Caselli
and Coleman (2001) discussed earlier. They rely on a more complicated two-sector model
in order to highlight the underlying reasons for convergence, but their model may|for the
purpose of predicting the level of direction of capital ows|be approximated by a simple
5Given that output data is not available before 1963, we use income instead on the X-axis for the pre-
1960 period. We realize that this is contradictory to our key assumption in the model that with perfectly
integrated markets output and income will dier. However, income is highly correlated with output as long
as labor income is not diversied and, with no other option available to us, we use income to illustrate our
point.
7one-sector model as outlined in Figure 1.
How do European countries t to this picture? This is the question that we are going to
investigate next.
2.3 Results: EU Countries
Figures 6{11 show that EU countries are still in the \catch-up growth" phase. We investigate
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s separately and plot the average current account balances during
these decades against output growth. We reverse the sign of the current accounts because we
focus our discussion on capital inows. Figures 6, 7, and 8 reveal a positive relation between
growth and capital ows as the simple neoclassical model would suggest. A close look reveals
that there is no relationship between growth and capital ows in the 1970s without Ireland,
which shows that Europe was not well integrated in our sense. In the 1980s and 1990s
nancial integration increased and capital started owing to high growth countries.
Figures 9, 10, and 11 reveal a negative relationship between the output level and capital
ows with little change over time. This evidence suggests that the EU countries are still in
the \catch-up" phase.6 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) consider the current account decit of
Portugal which in 2001 reached 10% of GDP, up from 2% at the start of the 1990s. Greece is
not far behind with a decit of 7% of GDP, up from 1% in the early 1990s. This is not the rst
time that small member countries of the European Union run large current account decits.
In the early 1980s, Portugal ran decits of a dierent kind. Portugal then was still reeling
from its 1975 revolution, from the loss of its colonies, and from the second oil shock and the
government was running a large budget decit. These decits turned out to be unsustainable:
Between 1980 and 1987, the escudo was devalued by 60% and the current account decit was
eliminated. In contrast, Portugal today is not suering from large adverse shocks; the ocial
budget decit has been reduced since the early 1990s. The fact that Portugal and Greece are
each members of both the European Union and the Euro area, and, in each case, the poorest
members, suggests a natural explanation for these current account decits. The decits are
exactly what theory suggests can and should happen when countries become more closely
linked in goods and nancial markets. If relatively poor countries have higher rates of return
to capital, poor countries should see an increase in investment. If they further have high
growth prospects, they should also see a decrease in saving according to permanent income
6We do not expect the model to t perfectly at the country level because of its simplicity. For example,
the assumption of a constant saving rate may be particularly heroic for countries which have, more or less,
independent scal policies. Also, a country such as the Netherlands may have relatively high growth and high
saving due to an aging population. We here focus only on the \big picture" and do not attempt to reach a
model with a better t.
8theory. Thus, on both counts, poor countries should run larger current account decits.
Symmetrically, richer countries should run larger current account surpluses. Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2002) conclude that integration aects current account balances and the Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle does not exist in Europe anymore.
Abiad, Leigh, and Mody (2007) similarly show that, unlike the global sample, in Europe
capital ows \downhill" and capital ows have accelerated with increased nancial integra-
tion and supported income convergence. They argue that Europe is the best place to test the
relationship between nancial integration and income convergence since the extent of nan-
cial integration within Europe is greater than in any other signicant geographical region.
They nd a substantial ow of foreign capital from advanced countries to the new EU mem-
ber countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Caselli and Tenreyro (2005) revisit Western
Europe's record of labor-productivity convergence. They nd that the poorer Western Euro-
pean countries caught up with the richer ones through both higher rates of physical capital
accumulation and greater total factor productivity gains. These (relatively) high rates of
capital accumulation and TFP growth reect convergence along two margins. One margin
(between industries) is a massive reallocation of labor from agriculture to manufacturing and
services, which have higher capital intensity and use resources more eciently. The other
margin (within industries) reects capital deepening and technology catch-up at the industry
level.
Ekinci, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sorensen (2007) investigate EU regions with a focus on capital
ows between regions within countries. They nd large net capital ows to high productivity
regions within countries of northern Europe, whereas there is weak evidence for regions of
southern Europe. They also nd that European countries are far from fully integrated in the
sense of both equal returns to capital and perfectly diversied ownership.
3 Capital Flows and Institutions
3.1 Countries
In this section, we provide simple suggestive evidence that institutions broadly dened are
important determinants of capital ows. First we estimate an index that shows the degree
of capital market integration. The index will be based on the responsiveness of capital
income ows to productivity growth and derived from the model that is described in section
2.1. Specically, we examine whether the change of the output/income ratio is positive for
regions with high growth using regression methods. As discussed before, intuitively, if capital
ownership is fully diversied, the capital in a region will mainly be owned by non-residents.
9Assuming that the income share of capital is 0.33, a relative increase in growth should be
associated with an increase in the ratio of output to income of about one-third times the
relative change in growth because a fraction 0.33 of the growth in output is generating capital
income which is diused over the whole EU.7 Thus we interpret the slope coecient from
the regression of the change in the output/income ratio on regional growth as the de-facto
measure of nancial integration.
The regression takes the form
(OUTPUT=INCOME)i =  + log GDPi + ei;
where (OUTPUT=INCOME)i = (OUTPUT=INCOME)i;2003 (OUTPUT=INCOME)i;1996 and log GDPi =
log GDPi;1994  log GDPi;1991: The sample for growth and for the output/income ratio are non-
overlapping to prevent measurement errors in output to enter on both sides of the equality
sign because that would create a spurious correlation between the left- and right-hand sides.
GDP growth on the right-hand side is per capita and averaged over three years in order to
minimize the impact of short term uctuations. The change in the output/income ratio is
calculated for 7 years, rather than 1, in order to capture \medium run" changes. The regres-
sion estimate of  is equivalent to the slopes of the tted lines in Figures 6{8 for the most
recent sample we have available.
In Figure 12, we plot this capital ows-productivity index; i.e., the estimated value of 
against the cost of entry from Djankov et al. (2002). There is a negative relationship between
the two, indicating capital does not fully ow to from less productive to more productive
countries within the EU if the countries involved have high business entry costs. Figure 13
plots the same measure against an index of property rights from ICRG and it is evident that
among the productive countries the ones with more investor rights and less corruption will
receive more capital ows. Figures 12 and 13 suggest that nancially integrated countries
with good institutions obtain more ows than countries with worse institutions when hit by
positive productivity shocks.
As noted above, Ekinci, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sorensen (2007) nd that large net capital
ows to high productivity regions within countries of northern Europe, whereas there is weak
evidence for regions of southern Europe. The dierences in the ndings for the northern and
southern regions within countries are correlated with variables such as expropriation risk,
government stability, and law and order. However, these variables do not fully explain the
dierences. In Italy and Spain, net income ows appear to be inuenced signicantly by
7Full derivation of this result is shown in Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, Sorensen, and Yosha (2007).
10patterns of government taxes and transfers. Ekinci, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sorensen (2007)
also nd regions with high condence and trust have the level of nancial integration that is
consistent with full integration.
4 Conclusion
We expect to nd that capital will ow to relatively poor regions during a \catch-up growth"
phase and when this phase is over will ow to regions with high productivity. U.S. states
today are characterized by this second phase: within U.S. capital ows to high output states.
EU countries still appears to be in the \catch-up" growth phase: within-EU capital ows to
poor but fast growing countries such as Greece and Portugal.
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13Table 1: State \Current Accounts" from Romans
S{I in 1953 S{I in 1957 S{I in 1953 S{I in 1957
per capita per capita millions millions
Alabama {114 {629 {54 {319
Alaska . . . .
Arizona {1226 {654 {170 {120
Arkansas {576 {559 {159 {158
California 648 876 1231 2039
Colorado 216 {195 48 {53
Connecticut 1229 946 413 364
Delaware 2058 3970 112 276
Florida 542 956 278 682
Georgia {29 {259 {16 {159
Hawaii . . . .
Idaho {963 {754 {89 {79
Illinois 623 {19 876 {30
Indiana {473 {1398 {307 {1033
Iowa 819 {68 334 {30
Kansas {116 {688 {36 {239
Kentucky {404 {280 {182 {134
Louisiana {1316 {1472 {585 {748
Maine 247 247 35 38
Maryland 543 154 216 72
Massachusetts 982 1401 732 1127
Michigan 88 {342 93 {422
Minnesota 503 318 238 170
Mississippi {110 {807 {36 {275
Missouri 847 502 528 343
Montana {754 {533 {72 {58
Nebraska 778 {519 159 {118
14State \Current Accounts" from Romans|continued
S{I in 1953 S{I in 1957 S{I in 1953 S{I in 1957
per capita per capita millions millions
Nevada {595 {118 {18 {5
New Hampshire 1309 557 111 52
New Jersey 486 521 394 488
New Mexico {1655 {1064 {194 {147
New York 1461 1790 3517 4783
North Carolina {133 {205 {85 {146
North Dakota {1292 {781 {122 {78
Ohio {869 {531 {1157 {815
Oklahoma 30 {508 10 {189
Oregon {48 {408 {12 {114
Pennsylvania 79 620 131 1109
Rhode Island 681 1195 86 166
South Carolina {192 {447 {65 {166
South Dakota 149 {230 15 {25
Tennessee {328 {275 {169 {154
Texas {580 {1246 {750 {1844
Utah {175 {1039 {20 {140
Vermont 408 130 24 8
Virginia {63 {99 {35 {62
Washington {173 {664 {66 {295
West Virginia {909 {1470 {272 {442
Wisconsin 324 {42 176 {26
Wyoming {1357 {1756 {61 {90
Notes: These data is from Romans (1965). \S I" is the dierence between state-level saving and state-level
investment for the given years. All series are in 2000 prices. Romans' total investment estimates for each state
are calculated by aggregating investment in manufacturing, mining, railroads, other transportation, public
utilities, communications, agriculture, and construction. He uses annual surveys for some industries and
balance sheets of companies (railways, utilities,etc.) for others. For industries where neither is available, he
imputes from aggregate investment gures utilizing state-level wages and salaries for that particular industry.
His saving estimates are based on state-level data, when available, on currency and bank deposits, saving
and loan shares, private insurance and pension reserves, consumer debt, securities loans, mortgages, and bank
debt, and involves a large number of imputations.
15Table 2: State \Current Accounts" and Net Capital Income
Dependent Variable: Log of Average Output/Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample 1963 1970 1971 1980 1981 1990 1991 2000
States 47 47 47 47
Average Saving minus Investment {0.09 {0.10 {0.08 {0.04
per capita 1953 1957 (5.04) (4.30) (2.54) (2.32)
R2 0.51 0.50 0.29 0.19
Source: Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, Sorensen, and Yosha (2007).
Notes: 47 observations (missing data for Alaska and Hawaii; the outlier Delaware is left out). Average
Output/Income is output divided by income (and normalized by U.S. output/income), where output is Gross
State Product (GSP) and income is State Personal Income (SPI), averaged over the relevant sample, given in
\Sample". Average Saving minus Investment per capita 1953 1957 is the dierence between state-level saving
and state-level investment per capita, averaged for the two years for which this data is available, 1953 and
1957. State-level investment and state-level saving are from Romans (1965) and used in thousands of dollars
in 2000 prices in the above regressions. See table 1 for the detailed explanations of state-level investment
and saving estimates. A constant is included in all specications. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics in
parentheses.
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